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Short Tendering Rule In
The Sale Of Securities
Larry A. Oday*
RULE lOb-4 OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Commission, also
known as "the short tendering rule," might be described as one of
the best kept secrets in securities regulation. Although it has been
in effect for more than three years, very few attorneys or brokers
know anything about it or have even heard of it.
A short tender is an offer to sell more stock than one owns. The
short tendering rule prohibits short tenders in response to a tender
offer. Typically, a tender offer states the total number of shares to be
purchased and also reserves the right to accept by lot; on a first-come,
first-served basis; or pro rata in case of oversubscription. The abuse
which the short tendering rule was designed to prevent occurs when
acceptance in case of oversubscription is to be pro rata. To make the
tender offer attractive, particularly in takeover attempts, the price
to be paid for the stock is set well above the market. Before the
adoption of the short tendering rule, broker A could offer to sell more
shares than he owned, taking the risk that should his entire offer be
accepted he could purchase needed covering shares in the market at
a lower price. In addition, offering more shares than he in fact owned
made more likely that those shares he in fact owned would be ac-
cepted pro rata. This worked to the detriment of seller B who offered
to sell only the number of shares he actually owned by increasing
the chances of oversubscription and concomittant activation of pro
rata acceptance. In such a situation seller B might find that only 400
of his 500 shares were bought and that he remained the unwilling
owner of 100 shares (which ownership may afford him very little
control over the affairs of the corporation), whereas had broker A
not short tendered, seller A could have sold all 500 of his shares at
a price inflated for their control value.
Historical Background
The rule grew out of the 1967 Senate hearings on the Williams
amendments. The Banking and Currency Committee of the Senate
made the following comments:
At the hearings, the committee was informed of a practice
known as short tendering in which brokers tender securities
they do not own. Tender offers commonly provide that the stock
certificates need not be deposited if a bank or a member firm of a
stock exchange guarantees that the certificates will be delivered
on demand or at a specified time if they are accepted. This pro-
cedure was originally introduced to permit acceptance on behalf
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of shareholders who were out of town or otherwise not in a
position to deposit their certificates. It has, however, resulted
in abuses. For example, if a broker estimates that only half of the
shares tendered will be accepted, on a pro rata basis, he can tender
without depositing, twice as many shares as he owns. As a result,
all of the shares which he actually owns will be accepted, and the
number of shares purchased from other investors will be cor-
respondingly reduced.' (emphasis supplied)
It is important to bear in mind that this was part of the Committee's
report on the Williams Amendments dealing with full disclosure of
equity ownership of securities in connection with tender offers. The
Senate committee concluded its remarks on short tendering by serving
notice to the Securities and Exchange Commission to act:
The committee believes the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission at present has adequate power to deal with the abuse
of short tendering under the antifraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.2
Shortly thereafter the Securities and Exchange Commission served
notice of its proposal to adopt rule lOb-4.
As proposed in January, 1968, the rule defined as a "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance", as such terms are used in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for someone other than the owner
of the securities to tender or give a guarantee of tender on behalf of
another, unless the guarantor acting in good faith believes that the
other person owns the tendered security and will make delivery of
the security.4 Thus, from the beginning, the Securities and Exchange
Commission was willing to make an exception for brokers and banks
to guarantee delivery of shares actually owned by customers who
are unable to deposit their securities before the termination of the
tender offer.
The proposed rule also set forth criteria for determining owner-
ship of a tendered security. One would be considered the owner if:
1) He or his agent has title to it;
2) He has entered into an unconditional binding contract for the
purchase of it even though he has not received it;
3) He owns a security convertible into or exchangeable for the
tendered security and has transmitted such security for con-
version or exchange;
4) He has an option to purchase and has exercised the option;
5) He has rights or warrants to subscribe for such securities and
has exercised such rights or warrants. 5
The final qualification is that a person is deemed to own a security
only to the extent that he has a net long position.6 In short, these
I S. Rep. No. 500, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
2 Id.
3 SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8224 (January 3, 1968).
41d. at 2.
5 1d. at 3.
4ld.
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are the same standards that apply to rule 10a-1 dealing with short
sales. 7
The January release ended with an invitation to all interested
persons to submit views and comments on the proposal. Five months
later the Securities and Exchange Commission announced the adop-
tion of the rule.8
The Commission did not add a great deal more to its comments
in the May, 1968, release, but it did clarify a few questions. First,
the rule acts to prohibit short tendering only in connection with a
tender offer or request or invitations for tenders of a security.9 Thus
the rule is not applicable unless an offer for tenders has preceded
the short tendering. Second, the rule applies to both cash for stock
and stock for stock transactions, the latter being known as an ex-
7 Id.
.s SEC, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8321 (May 28, 1968).
The rule as it was adopted, and as it remains today, reads as follows:
Rule lOb-4. Short tendering of Securities.
(a) It shall constitute a 'manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance' as used
in Section 10(b) of the Act for any person, in response to an offer for, er to a request
or invitation for tenders of,,any security,
(1) to tender any security for his own account unless (A) he owns the security or,
(B) he owns a security convertible into or exchangebale for, or owns an option,
warrant or right to purchase the tendered security, intends to acquire the tendered
security, by conversion exchange, or exercise of such option, warrant or right to
the extent necessary to deliver the tendered security, and upon the acceptance of
his tender, he does convert, exchange, or exercise such option, or right to the
extent necessary to deliver the tendered security, Provided, however, that if he
tenders a security on the basis of his ownership of an option to purchase such
security, he shall have reason to believe that the maker or writer of the option
has title to and possession of such security and will promptly deliver it upon
exercise of the option; or,
(2) to tender or guarantee the tender of any security on behalf of another person,
unless (A) such security is in the possession of the person making the tender or
giving the guarantee, or (B) the person making the tender or giving the guaran-
tee, upon information furnished by the person on whose behalf the tender or
guarantee is made, has reason to believe that such person owns the security ten-
dered and, as soon as possible, without undue inconvenience or expense, will de-
liver the security for the purpose of the tender to the person making the tender or
giving the guarantee, or (C) the person on whose behalf the tender or guarantee
is made owns a security convertible into, or exchangeable for, or owns an option,
warrant or right to purchase the tendered security and the person making the
tender has reason to believe that such other person intends to acquire the tendered
security, by the conversion, exchange, or exercise of such option, or right to the
extent necessary to deliver the tendered security. Provided, however, that if the
tender or guarantee of the tender of a security is made on the basis of the owner-
ship of an option to purchase such security, the person making the tender or guar-
antee shall have reason to believe that the maker or writer of the option has title
to and possession of such security and will promptly deliver it upon exercise of
the option.
(b) For the purposes of this Rule, a person shall be deemed to own a security if(1) he or his agent has title to it; or (2) he has purchased, or has entered into an
unconditional contract, binding on both parties thereto, to purchase it but has not yet
received it; or (3) he owns a security convertible into or exchangeable for it and has
tendered such security for conversion or exchange; or (4) he has an option to purchase
or acquire it and has exercised such option; or (5) he has rights or warrants to sub-
scribe to it and has exercised such rights or warrants. Provided, however, that a per-
son shall be deemed to own securities only to the extent that he has a net long position
in such securities.
I1d.
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change offer.10 Third, and most importantly for brokers, although
the rule prohibits short tendering, it still is possible for a broker or
a bank to guarantee delivery for customers who own the tendered
securities, but who are unable to deposit their securities before the
termination of the tender offer.1 Finally, the Commission cited sec-
tions 10(b) and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act as the statutory
basis for promulgating the Rule.
12
The rule was adopted and went into effect July 1, 1968. Now, over
three years later, it sits there, waiting for its first court action en-
forcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Fraud Requirements and the Bache Case
The rule makes short tendering a "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" as such terms are used in section 10(b) of the
1934 Act. What does this mean? Do the fraud requirements of the
other 10(b) rules apply to lOb-4? Let us look first at the general
meaning of fraud as used in the securities acts.
It is well settled that the type of "fraud" required to establish
a violation of the acts is less than the requirements at common law.
13
The intent seems to be that the securities acts in general, and section
10(b) of the 1934 Act in particular, are to be interpreted broadly 14
so as to effectuate the remedial purposes of the legislation.15 Thus it
would seem that the liberal interpretation would apply to the short
tender rule as well, but there are disturbing rumblings to the con-
trary on the basis of the Bache case.16
In Bache, a broker was suing the tender offeror for failure to
accept all the shares tendered before the offer terminated. The de-
fendant raised, inter alia, rule 10b-4 as a defense, on the grounds that
the plaintiff had erroneously short tendered 148 shares out of a total
of 30,649. The error was the result of a duplication in orders and was
corrected immediately upon discovery the next day. As a result the
court disallowed the defense. In so doing, the court held that the rule
does not apply where there is such a small percentage of shares short
tendered and where there is no evidence of a specific intent to
defraud. Further, it was held that the manipulation must be of the
normal pro rata requirements of the tender offer.17
Potentially, this decision raises more problems than it solves. It
would certainly seem that the case runs counter to the spirit of other
10 Id.
11 Id. at 2.
12 Id.
13 Lerman v. Tenney, 295 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
14 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Gulf Internat'l Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987
(S.D. Fla. 1963).
15 Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F. 2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969).
16 Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 324 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
17 IS
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court decisions that section 10(b). should be interpreted broadly so as
to effectuate the remedial purposes of the legislation.
First, the court held that a short tendering of 148 shares out of
30,649 was not sufficient to bring it within the purview of the rule.
The question then arises-what would have been enough shares?
Would 1,000 have been a significant number? Would the result have
been different in Bache if the 148 shares had been the difference be-
tween control and non-control or if the tender-offeror had relied, to
his detriment, on those 148 shares? In any case, the rule itself does
not prohibit the short tendering of a "significant number of securi-
ties," but prohibits it for "ANY SECURITY."
The court's second holding that a mere mistake will not invoke
the rule, seems to indicate that scienter is a requirement in order
to establish fraud in securities act cases. Yet there are many cases
to the contrary.' s This contrary view is consonant with the general
rule that the requirements of proof to find fraud in securities cases
are not as stringent as are the requirements of the common law.
The court's third holding was that there must be a specific intent
to defraud. An act of mere negligence was not enough. Yet the courts
have held in other areas of the securities statutes that such intent
is not necessary. For example, it has been held unnecessary to show
a specific intent to defraud in order to prove a violation of section
14(e) of the 1934 Act.19
One should, therefore, not be guilty of reading too much into
the Bache case. The holding is really very limited and is probably
correct as it is applied to the specific facts in that case. Indeed, one
can argue that Bache is a very good example of self-compliance with
the rule.
Possibilities for Civil Litigation
The question remains as to what application the rule has for the
securities specialist. Specifically, what potential does rule 10b-4 have
in court? Certainly it has been of very little value to date since not
even the Securities and Exchange Commission has made use of the
rule. In a letter to the author, the Commission stated that it was not
aware of any enforcement action, either legal or equitable, that it
has taken against any violator of the rule.20 It is clear, however, that
the Commission would sue for injunction if the need should arise.
In this respect, the enforcement of the rule is the same as any of the
other rules under section 10(b). However, to date the rule has re-
18 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F. 2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) ; Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963).
10 Butler Aviation Internat'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
20 Letter from Ezra Weiss, Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and Markets of Securities
and Exchange Commission by Albert D. Sturtevant, Attorney, to Larry A. Oday, dated
August 20, 1971.
Jan. 1972
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mained an unused tool by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
One can only speculate as to why this is so. Two answers come imme-
diately to mind. The first possible answer is that brokers stopped
short tendering when the rule was promulgated. The second possibil-
ity is that the Commission has not bothered to enforce infractions of
the rule. Undoubtedly, neither of these is the whole answer, but both
are probably true to some extent.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Securities and Exchange
Commission has seen no necessity to bring action based upon the
rule is no reason for the attorney who is embroiled in civil litigation
over a takeover bid to ignore its possibilities. Clearly the attorney for
the defendant did not in the Bache case. Indeed, one of the significant
results of that case is that the court impliedly allowed the rule to be
a potential defense. The court did not say that the rule per se was not
a defense, but only that under the particular facts of that case, rule
10b-4 was not applicable as a defense.21 Obviously then, the rule can
be used for the benefit of the tender of feror who has suffered as a
result of the short tendering of a broker or stockholder in civil liti-
gation.
However, it is for another potential plaintiff that the rule remains
a great untapped resource. This is the target corporation of the tender
offer, or, in a derivative suit, the shareholder in same. In this respect
rule 10b-4 can be used as rule 14a-9 was in 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak.
22
That case upheld the right of shareholders to sue in the appropriate
federal district court to enforce any liability or duty created under
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. 28 The object in Borak was
dissolution of a merger. The purpose would be the same in a suit for
the target corporation or shareholder using rule 10b-4. In the first
instance there was a violation of the proxy rules, and in the second
it would be short tendering. The two are analagous in the sense that
what the Commission is seeking is disclosre-full and complete dis-
closure. As was noted earlier rule lOb-4 was an outgrowth of the
Williams amendments. Those amendments were aimed at disclosure
by the parties involved in tender offers, principally the offeror. A
principal reason for the passage of those amendments was to prevent
a person from accomplishing through a tender offer what he had not
been able to accomplish with a proxy fight. Now with both, dis-
closure is required. A short tender is a kind of non-disclosure. It would
seem that that is why the Commission made short tendering a "man-
ipulative and deceptive device or contrivance." Thus should a broker
short tender, the target corporation can use this transgression by the
broker to void the deal and keep the corporate raider-tender offeror
from taking over.
21 Bache & Co. v. international Control Corp., 324 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
22 J. 1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
23 Id.
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Conclusion
A philosophy which could justifiably be adopted in regard to rule
lOb-4 is that the professional broker should be stopped from using
his superior knowledge of the relative success of a particular tender
offer without disclosure. Bearing that in mind, it is perhaps not so
extraordinary that so few brokers have knowledge of the rule-and
for those that do the knowledge is limited. (The author personally
spoke with ten executives of brokerage houses in Cleveland. Not a
single one was familiar enough with the rule to comment on it.)
It is also, perhaps, not so extraordinary that there are no reported
cases of Security and Exchange Commission enforcement action or
action between civil litigants. The explanation for this is, hopefully,
that the brokers are complying with the rule.
So rule lOb-4 remains in virtual oblivion. Nevertheless, it can be
a very valuable tool to force full disclosure in tender offers. The rule
also has enormous potential for civil litigation where the target cor-
poration is interested in resisting the takeover bid of the corporate
raider. Only time will tell whether this full potential will be tapped
or whether the rule will fade even further into oblivion.
Jan. 19,72
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